Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Czeslaw Lejewski on Proper Names - Dictionary of Arguments
Prior I 167 Preliminary remark: Extensionality/Prior: Philosophers who are not extensionists believe that Russell's individual names cannot exist. They therefore find the complications acceptable. >Extensions, >Extensionality, >Singular Terms, >Real Names/Russell. Prior I 167 Names/Lejewski: for him, names can be either singular or empty, but not plural. "Non plural names": can be logically complex (normal names cannot). >Complexity, >Simplicity. For this purpose, a special functor with its own axioms is used. For example, this functor could be the Lesniewskian individual identity, the form "a = a" which is true if "a" is applied to an object, and false if not. >Reference, >S. Lesniewski. Name/Aristotle: can be singular or plural, but not empty! If complex names are introduced here, you must make sure that the composition is not empty. For example, even if "a" and "b" have applications, "a and b" need not have any. >Aristotle. If "Socrates" is not plural, it does not follow that "Not Socrates" is also not plural. For example, there could be a million Not-Socrates. Solution/Lejewski: introduces a "definition frame": only allows names like "He, the only one who is not Socrates." N.B.: nevertheless, the verb "is not Socrates" can be applied to many objects. Cf. >"Exactly one", >Predicates, >Predication, >Generality, >Generalization._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lejewski, Czeslaw Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Lejewski
> Counter arguments in relation to Proper Names
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28